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1 Introduction
The recent phenomenal growth of private-equity investment strategies in which rms often hold
partial ownership interests in competing rms has led competition agencies to take an increased
interest in assessing the competitive e¤ects of partial horizontal acquisitions.1 For example, in
2007, the European Commission assessed and rejected a request by Aer Lingus to order Ryanair
to divest its 29.4% shareholding in the Irish ag carrier. Also in 2007, the UK Competition
Commission assessed the BskyBs acquisition of a 17.9% shareholding in ITV (with no board
representation) and found that would substantially lessen competition in the UK TV market.
More recently, in 2008, the European Commission assessed and approved subject to conditions,
the acquisition by News Corporation of an approximately 25% shareholding in Premiere.
Partial ownership interests raise antitrust concerns about unilateral e¤ects and coordinated
e¤ects. The assessment of the former has been recently studied by Brito et al. (2013a, hereafter
BRV) who provide an empirical structural methodology that follows a number of central aspects
of Reynolds and Snapp (1986), Bresnahan and Salop (1986), Flath (1992), OBrien and Salop
(2000), Dietzenbacher, Smid and Volkerink (2000) and Brito et al. (2013b). This article focuses
on the assessment of the latter.
The coordinated e¤ects of partial acquisitions ow from the repeated interaction among
rms in the market, an interaction that provides a structure in which a coordinated (agree-
ment) outcome may be supported, not by explicit negotiation, but as a (tacit) non-cooperative
equilibrium, under the credible threat that defections (or deviations) from this coordinated
arrangement would trigger retaliation (or punishment) by rivals. In analyzing the coordinated
e¤ects of partial ownership arrangements, competition agencies need to evaluate whether a
proposed acquisition changes the manner in which rms in the market interact, increasing the
strength, extent or likelihood of coordinated conduct.
We propose an empirical structural methodology to evaluate quantitatively the coordinated
e¤ects of actual and hypothetical partial horizontal acquisitions in a di¤erentiated products
setting. The proposed methodology relates to two strands of the literature. The rst strand
of literature examines the theoretical impact of partial competitor ownership on the likelihood
of a tacit coordinated agreement. In one of the earliest contributions, Reynolds and Snapp
1A key issue in the explanation of private equity growth over the past few years is the fact that private equity
investment has been a crucial source of nancing for many entrepreneurial ventures (Lerner et al.,2012).
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(1986) argue that, in markets where entry is di¢ cult, partial nancial interests and small
joint ventures can facilitate coordination among rivals by reducing the incentive of any single
target rm to deviate from the coordinated arrangement because the increased deviation prot
is shared with the acquiring rm(s). Malueg (1992) formally examines this argument in the
context of an innitely repeated Cournot homogeneous-product symmetric duopoly model in
which each rmsingle shareholder holds an identical partial nancial interest in the rival. He
studies the likelihood of coordination assuming that rms adopt the most basic enforcement
mechanism in the repeated game such that, should any single rm in any past period deviate
from the coordinated arrangement, reverts permanently to the static Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
The analysis extends the literature by showing that partial nancial interests have in fact two
conicting e¤ects on the likelihood of a tacit coordinated agreement. On the one hand, as argued
by Reynolds and Snapp (1986), partial nancial interests can facilitate coordination by reducing
the incentive of target rms to deviate from the coordinated arrangement because the increased
deviation prot is shared with the acquiring rm(s). On the other hand, partial nancial
interests can hinder coordination by increasing the incentive of all rms to deviate because
such links soften market competition and induce, in case of defection from the agreement, a
reversion to a more protable Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Following the dynamic oligopoly
theoretical literature, he measures the likelihood of a tacit coordinated agreement in terms of
the set of discount factors (used to calculate the present discounted value of rms prots in the
repeated model) for which coordination can be sustained and nds that the net result of the two
e¤ects is, in general, ambiguous and depends critically on the shape of the demand function,
that can alter both quantitatively and qualitatively the impact of such partial interests on the
above mentioned set of discount factors.
Gilo et al. (2006) extend Malueg (1992)s analysis to the context of an innitely repeated
Bertrand homogeneous-product symmetric n-rm oligopoly model in which both rms and
shareholders may hold a complex, not necessarily identical, partial nancial interests in rivals,
and follow grim-trigger strategies that, should any single rm in any past period deviate from
the coordinated arrangement, reverts permanently to the static Bertrand-Nash equilibrium.
In this framework, the static Nash equilibrium is not impacted by partial acquisitions, which
allows the authors to focus the impact analysis on the rst (positive) e¤ect identied in Malueg
(1992): that partial nancial interests can facilitate collusion by reducing the incentive of target
rms to deviate from the coordinated arrangement (because the increased deviation prot is
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shared). They show that partial nancial interests do facilitate coordination if and only if a
set of conditions is satised cumulatively. If either one of those conditions fails, the likelihood
of a coordinated agreement is not a¤ected. Gilo et al. (2009) relax the symmetry assumption
in Gilo et al. (2006) and generalize the set of conditions that must be satised cumulatively in
order for partial nancial interests to facilitate coordination.2
The second strand of literature relates to the quantitative evaluation of the impact of merg-
ers on coordinated e¤ects. In contrast to the parallel unilateral e¤ects literature, there is no
consensus yet on how to measure the magnitude of coordinated e¤ects, with the literature sug-
gesting two basic approaches. Kovacic et al. (2007, 2009)s approach suggests evaluating how
a merger a¤ects the rms incentives for post-merger coordinated behavior and the stability
of such behavior. They quantify the former by the raw incremental prots from coordination
(the di¤erence between competitive and coordination prots) and the latter by the raw incre-
mental prots from deviations (the di¤erence between deviation and coordination prots). The
proposed procedure involves selecting a model of competition, tting and/or calibrating it to
the relevant features of the pre-merger market, and nally, using the tted and/or calibrated
model to compute the protability of coordination and of deviating from that agreement. The
approach assumes that the probability of coordination increases with the incremental prots
from coordination and decreases with the incremental prots from deviations. The authors
apply this procedure to several acquisitions by Hospital Corporation of America in the Chat-
tanooga, Tennessee area using a model of di¤erentiated products price competition, allowing
for the possibility of post-merger quality improvements among the merging rms, di¤erential
costs and capacity constraints.
Davis (2006) and Sabatini (2006), working initially independently and then jointly in Davis
and Sabatini (2011), extend Kovacic et al. (2007, 2009)s procedure suggesting (correctly to
the best of our knowledge) that the impact of a merger on the likelihood of a tacit coordi-
nated agreement can only be properly captured by incorporating the raw static incremental
prots in a dynamic oligopoly model. The proposed procedure is closely related to that used
2Gilo et al. (2006) show that an increase in the partial nancial interest of rm r in a rival s do facilitate
coordination "if and only if (i) each rm in the industry holds a stake in at least one rival, (ii) the maverick rm
in the industry (the rm with the strongest incentive to deviate from a collusive agreement) has a direct or an
indirect stake in rm r, and (iii) rm s is not the industry maverick." Following Flath (1992) the maverick has
an indirect stake in rm r if it holds a direct stake in rm t and, in turn, rm t holds a direct stake in rm r.
Gilo et al. (2009) show that an increase in the partial nancial interest of rm r in a rival s do facilitate colusion
"if and only if (i) the maverick rm in the industry has a direct or an indirect stake in rm r, and (ii) rm s is
not the industry maverick."
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to simulate the unilateral price e¤ects of mergers in di¤erentiated product markets. It involves
estimating the demand system and using the pre-merger data, jointly with an appropriate as-
sumption about the nature of pre-merger prices, to infer marginal costs, which are then used
to simulate rmsprots under the di¤erent elements of a coordination model: maintain the
coordinated arrangement, unilaterally defect from the coordinated arrangement, and punish
the defections of a rival. They consider two baseline models of coordination: joint prot max-
imization that assumes coordinating rms attempt to maximize their joint prots, and Nash
bargaining that assumes coordinating rms attempt to implement the Nash bargaining solu-
tion. Either model incorporates the standard incentive compatibility constraints that result
from coordination strategies sustained in grim-trigger strategies, although the authors discuss
two additional types of constraints: external stability constraints that emerge from the presence
of fringe rms and/or imports and agreement and monitoring constraints that derive from the
need to simplify complex environments by using simple and observable (monitorable) coopera-
tive agreements. The authors provide several alternatives to quantify the coordinated e¤ects of
a merger. If the discount factors of the rms in the industry are known (inferred from internal
documents or estimated from a rate of return model following the nancial economics literature),
the e¤ects can be evaluated directly by examining how the merger impacts the incorporated
constraints. Alternatively, and closely paralleling the dynamic oligopoly theoretical literature,
the impact of a merger on the likelihood of coordination can be evaluated by examining how it
a¤ects the critical discount factors that sustain that agreement. Davis and Huse (2010) provide
the rst application of this proposed methodology to the merger between Hewlett Packard and
Compaq in the network server market, accounting for multi-market contact, the presence of a
competitive fringe and of an antitrust authority, and show that, ceteris paribus, the incentives
to collude often fall as a result of a merger.
We specify a methodology that attempts to link these two strands of the literature. We
assume a setting similar to Friedman (1971) where oligopolistic rms interact repeatedly, by
playing an innite sequence of ordinary static games over time and across markets (Bernheim
and Whinston, 1990) and follow the most basic enforcement mechanism, grim-trigger strategies,
to sustain a coordinated arrangement. Each ordinary static game is modelled in the lines of
BRV, accounting for asymmetric multi- and di¤erentiated-product rms (Rothschild, 1999; Vas-
concelos, 2005; Kuhn, 2004), and distinguishing two distinct partial ownership rights: nancial
interest and corporate control (OBrien and Salop, 2000; Brito et al., 2013b). Financial interest
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refers to the right to receive the stream of prots generated by the rm from its operations and
investments, while corporate control refers to the right to make the decisions that a¤ect the
rm. We need to identify and distinguish the two rights because partial horizontal acquisitions
that do not result in e¤ective control raise antitrust concerns distinct from partial acquisitions
involving e¤ective control. When a rm acquires a partial nancial interest in a rival, it acquires
a share of its prots. In the lines of Malueg (1992), such acquisition impacts the likelihood of
coordinated conduct by reducing both the deviation prot of the acquired rm and the incentive
of the acquiring rm to compete aggressively, which softens equilibrium Nash punishments. On
the other hand, when a rm acquires corporate control in a rival, it acquires the ability to in-
uence the competitive conduct of the target rm. Such inuence may impact the likelihood of
coordination by facilitating the process of reaching an agreement and by inducing the acquired
rm to compete less aggressively against the acquiring rm, which again softens equilibrium
Nash punishments.
We use a procedure similar to Davis (2006) and Davis and Huse (2010) to simulate rms
counterfactual static prots under the di¤erent elements of the coordination model (agreement,
defection and punishment), which are then incorporated in the repeated game to identify the
minimal threshold for the discount factor that sustains coordination. The procedure can be used
to examine the impact of partial acquisitions involving only nancial interests, corporate control
or both. Furthermore, it can deal with direct and indirect partial ownership interests and nests
full mergers (100% nancial and control acquisitions) as a special case. This structural approach
to partial acquisitions has not been, to our knowledge, examined in any other academic study
and it may be a preferable method for competition policy issues to the current indirect methods
focused on measures of market concentration and on informal analysis of the features of the
market conducive to coordinated interaction.
We also provide an empirical application of the methodology to several acquisitions in the
wet shaving industry. On December 20, 1989, the Gillette Company, which had been the market
leader for years and accounted for 50% of all razor blade units sales, contracted to acquire the
wet shaving businesses of Wilkinson Sword in the United States (among other operations) to
Eemland Management Services BV (Wilkinson Swords parent company) for $72 million. It
also acquired a 22.9 percent of the nonvoting equity shares of Eemland for about $14 million.
On January 10, 1990, the Department of Justice instituted a civil proceeding against Gillette.
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The complaint alleged that the e¤ect of the acquisition by Gillette may have been substantially
to lessen competition in the sale of wet shaving razor blades in the United States. Shortly after
the case was led, Gillette voluntarily rescinded the acquisition of Eemlands wet shaving razor
blade business in the United States, but went through with the acquisition of 22.9% nonvoting
equity interest in Eemland. The Department of Justice approved the acquisition after being
assured that this stake would be passive. On March, 22, 1993, the Warner-Lambert Company
acquired Wilkinson Sword (full merger) for $142 million to Eemland, that had put the razor
blade company up for sale the year before. These two acquisitions (one involving a partial
interest and another a full merger), and two additional hypothetical ones, are evaluated below.
This article is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the empirical structural methodology
used to evaluate the coordinated e¤ects of partial acquisitions, Section 3 provides the above
mentioned empirical application and Section 4 concludes.
2 Empirical Structural Methodology
This section introduces the empirical structural methodology. We study the implications of
partial horizontal acquisitions on coordinated e¤ects that ow from the repeated interaction
among rms in the market. The methodology involves six steps similar to Davis (2006) and
Davis and Huse (2010). Step 0 consists of estimating consumer demand and assessing the degree
of substitutability between the competing products. Step 1 models each oligopolistic ordinary
static game in the lines of BRV, accounting for di¤erentiated products industries and asymmet-
ric multi-product rms (Rothschild, 1999; Vasconcelos, 2005; Kuhn, 2004) and distinguishing
partial ownership interests that may or may not correspond to control (OBrien and Salop, 2000;
Brito et al., 2013b). Step 2 uses an equilibrium behavior assumption for each ordinary static
game jointly with demand side estimates (from step 0) to recover (unobserved) marginal costs.
Step 3 models the oligopolistic supergame in a setting similar to Friedman (1971) where rms in
the industry play an innite sequence of ordinary games over time, providing a formal structure
in which a coordinated outcome may be supported as a non-cooperative equilibrium, under the
credible threat that defections from this tacit (non-cooperative) coordinated arrangement would
trigger retaliation by rivals.
In analyzing the coordinated e¤ects of partial ownership arrangements, competition agencies
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need to evaluate whether a proposed acquisition changes the manner in which rms in the
market interact, increasing the strength, extent or likelihood of coordinated conduct. Steps 4-5
address the likelihood of coordinated conduct pre-partial acquisition and step 6 the likelihood
post-partial acquisition. Step 4 uses the marginal costs recovered in step 2 jointly with the
demand side estimates from step 0 to simulate rmsstatic prots in the pre-partial acquisition
industry under the di¤erent elements of the coordination model: maintain the coordinated
arrangement, unilaterally defect from the coordinated arrangement, and punish the defections
of a rival. Step 5 uses those static prots to quantify the likelihood of a coordinated arrangement
by identifying the minimal threshold for the discount factor that sustains it in the supergame.
Finally, step 6 repeats steps 4 and 5 for di¤erent ownership structures of the industry to quantify
the coordinated e¤ects of actual and hypothetical partial acquisitions.
We now move on to describe steps 1-6 in more detail. We defer the description of step
0 to the next section when we introduce the consumer demand model, a random coe¢ cients
multinomial logit demand function, in the context of our empirical application.
Step 1: Model the Oligopolistic Ordinary Static Game
We introduce here the rms objective function and the assumptions of the ordinary static game
in a setting similar to OBrien and Salop (2000), Brito et al. (2013b) and BRV.
The Setup
There are a nite F number of rms, indexed by f , each of which produces, in each period t,
some subset,  fmt, of the Jmt alternative products available in market m 2   f1; : : : ;Mg.
There are also K shareholders, indexed by k, who can own shares in more than one rm. Let
  f1; : : : ;Kg denote the set of shareholders, which can include not just owners that are
external to the industry, but also owners from the subset =  f1; : : : ; Fg of rms within the
industry that can engage in rival cross-shareholding.
The implications of partial acquisitions on competition depends critically on two separate
and distinct elements: nancial interest and corporate control. Financial interest refers to the
right of the (partial) owner to receive a stake of the stream of prots generated by the rm
from its operations and investments, while corporate control refers to the right of the (partial)
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owner to make the decisions that a¤ect the rm. Firms sometimes have quite complex corporate
nancial and governance structures that distinguishes the two rights in voting and non-voting
(preferred) stock, with the latter giving the holder a share of the prots but no right to vote
for the Board or participate in other decisions. Without loss of generality, we assume this type
of structure and consider each rm fs total stock is composed of voting stock and non-voting
stock.
The nancial interest of shareholder k in rm f is represented by kf  0 which denotes the
shareholders holdings of total stock in the rm, regardless of whether it be voting or non-voting
stock. The degree of corporate control of shareholder k over the decision making of rm f is
a function of vkf  0 which denotes the shareholders holdings of voting stock in rm f . The
larger the holdings of voting stock in a rm, the greater the degree of control over the decision
making will typically be. However the relationship may not necessarily be linear. For example,
a shareholder holding 49 percent of voting stock in a rm may have no control over the decision
making of the rm if one other shareholder has 51 percent. In contrast, a shareholder holding
10 percent of voting stock in a rm may have e¤ective control over the decision making of the
rm if each of the remaining shareholders holds a very small amount of voting stock. As a
consequence, we denote the degree of corporate control of shareholder k in rm f by kf  0,
a measure of shareholder ks degree of control over the decision making of rm f that does not
necessarily correspond to vkf .3
Firms Operating Prot
As it will become apparent in step 3, the supergame describes the playing of an innitely re-
peated oligopolistic game with discounting by the above described F rms. Following Friedman
(1971), in each market and period, each rm has a set of strategies which is a compact, convex
subset of an Euclidean space of nite dimension. Let xfmt denote the strategy chosen from
that set by rm f in market m and period t, and let xt = (x1t; : : : ;xmt; : : : ;xMt)
0 denote the
corresponding vector of strategies, one for each market, with xmt = (x1mt; : : : ; xfmt; : : : ; xFmt).
The prots generated by a multi-market and multi-product rm f from its operations, in
each period t, are dened over the set of di¤erent markets and the subset  fmt of products
3Financial and corporate control interests may also depend on time period t. We do not make this dependence
explicit to avoid having to introduce an additional subscript.
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(pjmt  mcjmt) mtsjmt (pmt)  Cfmt; (1)
where sjmt (pmt) is the market share of product j in market m and period t, which is (by
denition of market) a function of the vector pmt of prices of the Jmt products available, mcjmt
is the (assumed constant) marginal cost of product j in market m and period t, mt is the size
of market m in period t, and Cfmt is the xed cost of production of rm f in market m and
period t.
Firms Aggregate Prot
In an industry characterized by rival cross-shareholding, the aggregate prots of rm f include
not just the stream of prots generated by the rm from its operations, but also a share in
its rivalsaggregate prots due to its ownership stake in these rms. We make the following
assumption regarding the distribution of those prots among shareholders:
Assumption 1 Each rms aggregate prot is distributed among shareholders proportionally to
the total stock owned, regardless of whether it be voting stock or preferred stock.
Under Assumption 1, in each period t, rm f receives a prot stream from its ownership
stake in rm g that corresponds to the percentage  fg of rm gs total stock owned. The
aggregate prot of rm f can, therefore, be written as:




where the rst term denotes the operating prot and the second term denotes the returns of
equity holding by rm f in any of the other rms.4 This set of F equations implicitly denes
the aggregate prot for each rm in each period.
Let D denote the F  F cross-shareholding matrix with zero diagonal elements,  ff = 0,
and o¤ diagonal elements  fg  0 (if f 6= g) representing the percentage held by rm f on rm
4The set ==f denotes the set = not including rm f .
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gs total stock. In vector notation, the aggregate prot equation becomes:
t = t (xt) +D
t;
wheret and t (xt) are F1 vectors of aggregate and operating prots in period t, respectively.
In order to solve for those prots explicitly, we make the following assumption regarding the
shareholder structure of the rms in the market:
Assumption 2 The rank of (I D) equals the number of rms in the market.
Under Assumption 2, matrix (I D) is invertible, which implies it is possible to solve for
the aggregate prot equation:
t (xt;D
) = (I D) 1 t (xt) ; (2)
where I denotes the identity matrix.
Managers Objective Function
In a standard oligopoly model with no partial ownership interests, barring any market imperfec-
tions that preclude e¢ cient contracting between the shareholders and the manager, the former
will typically agree, and give the appropriate incentives, that the manager should maximize
prots. However, as OBrien and Salop (2000) argue:
When multiple owners have partial ownership interests, (...) they may not agree on
the best course of action for the rm. For example, an owner of rm f who also
has a large nancial interest in rival rm g typically wants rm f to pursue a less
aggressive strategy than the strategy desired by an owner with no nancial interest
in rm g. In this situation, where the owners have conicting views on the best
strategy to pursue, the question arises as to how the objective of the manager is
determined. Ultimately, the answer turns on the corporate-control structure of the
rm, which determines each shareholders inuence over decision-making within the
rm. (page 609)
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We make the following assumption regarding the objective of the manager of the rm:
Assumption 3 The manager of the rm maximizes a weighted sum of the shareholders returns.
The formulation implied by Assumption 3 constitutes a parsimonious way to model share-
holder inuence since it includes a wide variety of plausible assumptions about the amount of
inuence each owner has over the manager of the rm. Under this formulation, a higher weight
on the return of a particular owner is associated with a greater degree of inuence by that
owner over the manager. Di¤erent control scenarios then correspond to di¤erent sets of control
weights for the di¤erent owners. Under Assumption 3, the objective function of the manager of





where kf measures (as described above) the degree of control of shareholder k over the manager
of rm f , and Rkt is the return of shareholder k in period t.
In a setting where each rms aggregate prot is, under Assumption 1, distributed among
shareholders proportionally to the total stock owned and each shareholder can have ownership
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$kt if k 2 =
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where the rst term involves the return of rival rms within the industry (k 2 ==f) that engage
in cross-shareholding and the second term involves shareholders that are external to the industry
(k =2 =). This set of F equations implicitly denes the objective function for each rm in each
period of the supergame.
Let C denote the F  F cross-shareholding matrix with zero diagonal elements, ff = 0,
and o¤ diagonal elements fg  0 (if f 6= g) representing the measure of rm fs degree of
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control over the manager of rm g. Let also C and D denote the (K   F ) F control interest
and nance interest shareholding matrices with typical element kf and kf , respectively.
5 In





where $t (xt) denotes the F  1 vector of objective functions for period t. In order to solve for
those functions explicitly, we make the following assumption regarding the shareholder control
structure of the rms in the market:
Assumption 4 The rank of (I C0) equals the number of rms in the market.
Under Assumption 4, matrix (I C0) is invertible, which implies it is possible to solve for















D (I D) 1 t (xt)
= Lt (xt) ; (5)
where I denotes the identity matrix and the second equality is obtained by simple substitution
of the aggregate prot equation (2). The last equality rewrites the objective function vector in
terms of the F  F matrix L = (I C0) 1C0D (I D) 1 with typical element lfg, for any
f; g 2 =.
Step 2: Recovering (Unobserved) Marginal Costs
Competitive Setting and Equilibrium Prices
Having described the objective function of the manager of the rm, we now address the com-
petitive setting. For expositional purposes, reorder and decompose the strategy vector as
xt = (xft;x ft)
0 where xft = (xf1t; : : : ;xfmt; : : : ;xfMt)
0 and x ft denotes the parallel strategy
vector with the choices of all rms except rm f .
5Note that both C and D matrices are dened only in terms of the set of shareholders external to the
industry, since the interests of the set of shareholders = of rms within the industry that can engage in rival
cross-shareholding are taken into account in matrices C and D.
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Assumption 5 Firms compete in prices. Furthermore, a pure-strategy Bertrand-Nash equilib-
rium exists, and the prices that support it are strictly positive.
Assumption 5 is illustrative. The proposed methodology is not constrained to this assump-
tion and remains valid under alternative strategy choices by rms (for example, Nash-Cournot
behavior or capacity-choice behavior). Furthermore, the assumption can be tested in the lines
of the empirical literature that attempts to evaluate the observed conduct of rms. Recent ex-
amples that attempt to test if observed equilibrium prices are consistent with Nash equilibrium
pricing include Nevo (2001), Slade (2004), Salvo (2010) and Molnar et al. (2013).
Under assumption 5, rms choose prices and therefore xt  pt = (pft;p ft). pft denotes
the strategy vector of prices controlled by rm f , i.e., the prices of the subset  fmt of products
produced by the rm in all m 2  and p ft denotes the strategy vector with the price choices
of the subset   fmt of products produced by all rms except rm f in all m 2 . Allon et
al. (2010) established the conditions under which a Nash equilibrium, in fact a unique equi-
librium, exists for the general multi-product price competition model with random coe¢ cients
multinomial logit demand functions (see Theorem 6.1 therein). Following the objective function















(pjmt  mcjmt) mtsjmt (pfmt;p fmt)  Cgmt
9=; ;
where the second equality makes use of equation (1).
The rst-order conditions yield that the price pjmt of any product j 2  fmt in each market






















where the strategy combination pnet is a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in prices that for all pft












. We can re-write this set of Jmt
equations in vector notation by dening a Jmt  Jmt matrix 
mt with the jr element given by
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mt (pnemt) (pnemt  mcmt) = 0;
where smt (pnemt) and mcmt are Jmt  1 vectors of shares and marginal cost in market m and
period t, respectively, and G denotes a Jmt  Jmt diagonal matrix with diagonal elements
gjj = lff for j 2  fmt.
Recovering (Unobserved) Marginal Costs
In order to use the above set of rst-order conditions to simulate counterfactual prices, we require
information on marginal costs that are typically unobserved. We propose to use assumption 5s
equilibrium behavior jointly with demand side estimates (from step 0) to recover the pre-partial
acquisition unobserved marginal costs. The procedure is as follows. The set of conditions above
implicitly describes the following markup equation for each of the Jmt products in market m
and period t:













This procedure assumes constant marginal costs. However, it can easily be extended to deal
with non-constant marginal costs. In this case, the set of Jt rst-order conditions di¤er slightly
from the above and the marginal costs can be recovered by estimating a marginal cost function
using, for example, a method of moments approach.
Let c@srmt (pne;premt ) =@pjmt denote the own- and cross-price e¤ects for any two products r and
j estimated in step 0 and evaluated at the subset pne;premt of the pre-partial acquisition observed
Bertrand-Nash equilibrium prices vector, pne;pret . Let also b
ne;premt denote the current ownership
structure matrix with the jr element given by b
ne;premt;rj =  lprefg c@srmt (pne;premt ) =@pjmt for r 2  gmt
and j 2  fmt, and Gne;pre denote the matrix with diagonal elements gjj = lpreff for j 2  fmt,
where lprefg represents the typical element of matrix L
pre=(I Cpre0) 1Cpre0Dpre (I Dpre) 1,
both computed under the pre-partial acquisition (corporate control and nancial interest) share-
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holders weights. Using the demand estimates from step 0 and the current ownership structure,
we can recover market ms subset vector of marginal costs by:
dmcpremt = pne;premt   b
ne;premt (pne;premt ) 1Gne;presmt (pne;premt ) ; (7)
wheredmcpremt = dmcpre1mt; : : : ;dmcprefmt; : : : ;dmcpreFmt0.
The empirical structural methodology just described to recover the marginal costs (and we
will see below to simulate counterfactuals) relies on the ability to consistently estimate the own-
and cross-price e¤ects required for every jr element of matrix 
mt: 
mt;rj =  lfg@srmt (pmt) =@pjmt
in step 0. We defer an analysis of this aspect of the procedure to the next section when we
introduce the consumer demand model in the context of our empirical application.
Step 3: Model the Oligopolistic Supergame
We introduce here the oligopolistic supergame in a setting similar to Friedman (1971) where
rms in the industry interact repeatedly and play an innite sequence of oligopolistic ordinary
games over time with discounting. Although this unlimited interaction assumption among
rms may seem unrealistic, it is fully mathematically equivalent to assuming that each rm
is uncertain about being in the market (the game may end with some probability) the period
after.
In this "innite" sequence of oligopolistic ordinary games over time, let p1 = fp0;p1; : : : ;pt; : : :g
denote a path of play, where as detailed before pt denotes the vector of strategies in period t.











where f 2 (0; 1) denotes the discount factor of rm f that represents its rate of time preference,
i.e., the weight that the rm places in future prots. If we assume risk-free rms that can freely
borrow at the market interest rate r, the discount factor will be common to the rms and equal
to 1 = : : : = f =  = 1= (1 + r). Because imperfect information in the capital market can
cause rms to have di¤erent costs of capital and, therefore, di¤erent discount rates of time
preference, we follow Harrington (1989) and allow for rm-specic discount factors.
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The repeated choice of the ordinary static games Bertrand-Nash prices is a sub-game perfect
equilibrium in prices of the supergame: pne1 = fpne0 ;pne1 ; : : : ;pnet ; : : :g. However, it is well known
that there may exist more protable strategies (Luce and Rai¤a, 1957; Friedman, 1971). When
choosing strategy pft, each rm f knows and therefore can condition upon the strategies of
every other rm in all previous periods. Friedman (1971) suggests that the repeated interaction
among rms in the industry provides a formal structure in which grim-trigger strategies may
support a collusive outcome as a non-cooperative equilibrium.






ft if pgl = p
c




where pcf1 and p
c
ft denote the vector of coordinated prices controlled by rm f for the ordinary
static game in period 1 and t, respectively, and (as before) pneft denotes rm fs vector of
Bertrand-Nash prices for the ordinary static game t.
In this type of strategy, each rm chooses to set coordinated prices in period 1 and trust
each other to continue to do so indenitely. In face of this coordinated conduct, individual rms
may be tempted to increase static prot for a period or so by deviating from the arrangement.
However, should any single rm in any past period choose something di¤erent (let pdft denote
the vector of defection, or deviation, prices controlled by rm f in ordinary static game t), trust
vanishes and each rm reverts permanently to a position in which no rm has any short-term
temptation to deviate: the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in prices.
The supergame grim strategy vector g =

g1; : : : ; 
g




may support a coor-
dinated outcome as a non-cooperative equilibrium under the credible threat that defections
from this coordinated arrangement would trigger retaliation by rivals. In particular,  is a
















 ; f 2 =:
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We acknowledge that the Nash reversion that characterizes the grim-trigger strategies es-
tablished in Assumption 6, while subgame perfect, is not in general optimal. Abreu (1986,
1988) discusses more sophisticated forms of retaliation, optimal punishments, that support the
maximal degree of coordination for arbitrary values of the discount factor. These optimal pun-
ishments have a stick-and-carrot structure that, for example, may include temporary price wars:
should any single rm in any past period deviate from the coordinated arrangement, each rm
reverts to a war state in which rms set below Bertrand-Nash price levels for some period of
time (stick) before reverting, if no rm deviates from the war state arrangement, to the co-
ordinated arrangement again (carrot). Although the extension of the methodology to Abreu
(1986, 1988)s optimal punishments is a very interesting potential area for future research, in
this article, we focus on developing an empirical methodology to quantify coordinated e¤ects for
the grim-trigger strategiesbenchmark. First, because this type of strategies has the advantage
of requiring simple calculations and also of being easily understood by market participants.
Second, because as pointed out by Harrington (1991):
It is quite natural to think of a punishment strategy as being an industry norm with
respect to rm conduct (...). Furthermore, once a norm is in place, rms may be
hesitant to change it (...). Thus, even though the norm might not be the best in
some sense (for example, it might not be a most severe punishment strategy), rms
might choose to maintain it if it seems to work. In light of this interpretation of a
punishment strategy, it seems plausible that the grim trigger strategy would be a
commonly used norm. (page 1089)
Step 4: Pre-Partial Acquisition Counterfactual Static Prices and Prots
In order to evaluate the pre-partial acquisition sustainability of a coordinated outcome as a
tacit non-cooperative equilibrium, we have to be able to empirically compute each rms ag-
gregate prot under three alternative individual behavior strategies: maintain the coordinated
arrangement, unilaterally defect from that arrangement, and punish the defections of a rival.
Under the grim-trigger strategies established in Assumption 6, defections from the coordi-
nated arrangement would trigger a Nash reversion punishment by rivals forever after, a position
in which no rm has any short-term temptation to deviate. Furthermore, following Assump-
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tion 5, the industry pre-partial acquisition is characterized by Bertand-Nash competition. As
a consequence, the vector of pre-partial acquisition Bertrand-Nash prices and aggregate prots
are directly observable and no counterfactual simulation is required. The same is not true,
however, for the remaining two elements (coordination and defection) of the no-deviation con-
ditions, requiring empirically counterfactual computation of each rms aggregate prot. In this
article, we consider the benchmark case of full tacit coordination, that encompasses all rms
in the market. We defer an analysis of other coordination agreements to future research. In
particular, the extension of the methodology to not all-inclusive coordination agreements in the
lines of Davis and Huse (2010) and Bos and Harrington (2010) seem a very interesting area of
future research.
Assumption 7 Tacit coordination involves all rms in the market. The managers of tacitly
coordinating rms maximize the joint weighted sum of the shareholders returns.
Step 4 uses the marginal costs recovered in step 2 jointly with the demand side estimates
from step 0 to simulate the static payo¤s for the rms in the pre-partial acquisition industry
under the two mentioned alternative individual behavior strategies. The details are given in
Appendix A.
Step 5: Likelihood of Coordinated Conduct
Step 5 uses the static prots computed in step 4 to quantify the likelihood of a tacit coordinated
arrangement by identifying the minimal threshold for the discount factor that sustains coordi-
nation in the supergame. We perform this quantication for the following useful benchmark:
Assumption 8 For any given ownership structure, the future operating prot of a rm is
time-independent.
Under Assumption 8, the aggregated prot function f (p;D) = ft (pt;D) for any f 2 =
and for any t = 0; 1; 2; : : :. Although this assumption constitutes a benchmark that rules out
tacit coordination settings with, for example, future demand growth, future demand uctu-
ations (deterministic or not) and future innovative activity, the proposed methodology is not
constrained to this assumption and remains valid under alternative settings. In this benchmark,
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the no-deviation conditions that ensure that the supergame grim strategy vector g supports a








bpdffg;pre;D f (bpc;pre;D) < f
1  f
[f (bpc;pre;D) f (pne;pre;D)] ; f 2 =;
which can be evaluated using the static prots computed in step 4.
This inequality makes clear the supergame grim strategy vector g supports equilibrium
coordinated conduct if, for every f 2 =, the one-shot net gain from deviating from the coor-
dinated agreement (the left term of the above inequality) is more than compensated by the
present discounted value of the long run benet from maintaining coordination in all succeeding
periods (the right term of the above inequality).
An alternative interpretation, paralleling the dynamic oligopoly theoretical literature, can







 bpdffg;pre;D f (pne;pre;D) ; f 2 =;
that shows the supergame grim strategy vector g supports equilibrium coordinated conduct if
the discount factor exceeds a critical threshold crt;pref for every f 2 =. In order for equilibrium
coordinated conduct to be sustained in the industry as a whole, rms need to be su¢ ciently











which constitutes our proposed quantitative measure of the likelihood of a tacit coordinated
arrangement in the pre-partial acquisition ownership structure.
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Step 6: Partial Acquisition Impact on the Likelihood of Coordinated Conduct
In analyzing the coordinated e¤ects of partial ownership arrangements, competition agencies
need to evaluate whether a proposed acquisition changes the manner in which rms in the
market interact, increasing the likelihood of coordinated conduct. Our methodology proposes
to assess this by quantifying the impact of the acquisition on the critical threshold of the discount
factor. The procedure is as follows. First, we empirically compute each rms post-acquisition
aggregate prot under the three discussed alternative individual behavior strategies: agreement,
defection and punishment. We do so by repeating step 4 for the new post-acquisition ownership
structure.
Assuming the partial-acquisition does not alter the competitive setting among rms nor
the vector of marginal costs (dmcpstt =dmcpret ), the vector of post-partial acquisitions predicted
(counterfactual) coordinated prices, bpc;pstt do not depend, under Assumption 7, on the actual
ownership structure.6 As a consequence, the vector of pre- and post-coordinated prices coincide,
bpc;pstt = bpc;pret , which implies that pre- and post-acquisition aggregate coordinated prots also
coincide: ft
bpc;pstt ;D = ft (bpc;pret ;D) for every f 2 = and time period t. The same is not
true, however, for the remaining two elements (defection and punishment) of the no-deviation
conditions, which still do require empirically counterfactual computation. The details are given
in Appendix A.
Although we assume the partial-acquisition does not alter the competitive setting among
rms, the proposed methodology is not constrained to having the same assumption of rm
behavior before and after the partial acquisition. If the partial-acquisition does alter the com-
petitive setting among rms, the methodology idea remains valid, the only di¤erence being that
the post-partial acquisition equilibrium price vector must solve the corresponding (new) set of
rst-order conditions.7
Having computed all the post-partial acquisition elements of the no-deviation conditions,
we can investigate the impact on the minimal threshold for the discount factor that enables the
6 In order to understand why, note that the set of rst-order conditions in equation (8) does not depend on L.
The reason being that each rm internalizes the e¤ects of price changes on the operating prots of all rms in
the industry.
7 In such cases, the methodology requires the computation not only of the defection and punishment elements
of the no-deviation conditions, but also of the coordinated element, all according to the new behavioral setting.
This will also be required, even in the absence of changes in the behavioral setting, if the partial acquisition
incorporates eventual cost e¢ ciencies that impact the marginal costs.
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supergame grim strategy vector g to support a coordinated outcome as a tacit non-cooperative
equilibrium. In order to do so, we rst compute the post-partial acquisition critical threshold


















where bpne;pst, bpc;pst and bpdffg;pst denote the vector of post-partial acquisitions predicted (coun-
terfactual) Bertrand-Nash, coordinated and rmfs deviation prices, respectively.
Having described the supply side of the model and the empirical structural methodology that
can be used to quantify the likelihood of a tacit coordinated arrangement that would result from
several partial acquisition counterfactuals, we move on to address the empirical illustration.
3 Empirical Application
In this section, we present an illustration of the structural methodology used to evaluate the
coordinated e¤ects of partial acquisitions. We apply our framework to several acquisitions in
the wet shaving industry. On December 20, 1989, the Gillette Company, contracted to acquire
the wet shaving businesses of Wilkinson Sword trademark outside of the 12-nation European
Community (which included the United States operations) to Eemland Management Services
BV (Wilkinson Swords parent company) for $72 million. It also acquired a 22.9 percent of
the nonvoting equity shares of Eemland for about $14 million. Gillette said that its reason for
participating in Eemland was solely its wish to acquire various Wilkinson Sword trade marks
and wet-shaving activities in certain countries outside the 12-nation European Community.
At the time, consumers in the United States annually purchased over $700 million of wet
shaving razor blades at the retail level. Five rms supplied all but a nominal amount of these
blades: Gillette Company, BIC Corporation, Warner-Lambert Company, Wilkinson Sword Inc.,
and American Safety Razor Company.
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On January 10, 1990, the Department of Justice instituted a civil proceeding against Gillette.
The complaint alleged that the e¤ect of the acquisition by Gillette may have been substantially
to lessen competition in the sale of wet shaving razor blades in the United States. Shortly after
the case was led, Gillette voluntarily rescinded the acquisition of Eemlands wet shaving razor
blade business in the United States. Gillette said it decided to settle the case to avoid the time
and expense of a lengthy trial. However, Gillette still went through with the acquisition of 22.9%
nonvoting equity interest in Eemland and of all worldwide assets and businesses of Wilkinson
Sword trademark from Eemland, apart from the United States and the European Community.
Because Eemland kept the Wilkinson Swords United States wet shaving razor blades business,
Gillette had became one of the largest, if not the largest, shareholder in a competitor. The
Department of Justice (1990) allowed the acquisition after being assured that this stake would
be passive.8 However, even when the acquiring rm cannot inuence the conduct of the target
rm, the partial acquisition may still raise antitrust concerns about unilateral and coordinated
e¤ects. BRV empirically examine the unilateral e¤ects of this stake. We examine the latter by
quantifying the coordinated e¤ects impact of the operation.
On March, 22, 1993, the Warner-Lambert Company acquired Wilkinson Sword for $142
million to Eemland, that had put the razor blade company up for sale the year before. The sale
was prompted after the European Commission, the executive arm of the European Community,
in November ordered the Gillette Company to sell its stake in Eemland because of antitrust
concerns. A full merger constitutes the extreme case of a partial acquisition, which is nested
in our empirical structural methodology. As an illustration we also examine this question and
quantify the corresponding coordinated e¤ects.
These two acquisitions, and two additional hypothetical ones, are evaluated below. In this
analysis, we make the following assumption regarding the measure of shareholder ks degree of
control over the manager of the rm:
Assumption 9 The control weight each owner has over the manager of the rm equals the
corresponding voting shares, i.e., kf = vkf .
8"Gillette and Eemland shall not agree or communicate an e¤ort to persuade the other to agree, directly or
indirectly, regarding present or future prices or other terms or conditions of sale, volume of shipments, future
production schedules, marketing plans, sales forecasts, or sales or proposed sales to specic customers (...)."
(Department of Justice, 1990).
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The article proceeds by describing the data and performing some preliminary analysis. We
then move on to describe the demand model, the estimation procedure and discuss the identify-
ing assumptions. Finally, we present the demand estimation results that we use to compute the
implied marginal costs and then simulate the coordinated e¤ects of the di¤erent acquisitions.
Data Description and Preliminary Analysis
We use scanner data collected from July 1994 to June 1996 from the Dominicks Finer Foods
(DFF) chain in the Chicago metropolitan area. The dataset covers 29 di¤erent product cat-
egories at the store level. It includes weekly sales, prices and retail prot margins for each
universal product code (UPC) and store of the chain. We supplemented the data with ZIP
code (i) demographic information obtained from the Decennial Census 2000, and (ii) industry
structure obtained from the Business Patterns 1998 databases.
In order to investigate the implications of Gillette 22.9% nonvoting equity interest acquisition
in Eemland and Warner-Lambert merger with Wilkinson Sword, we focus on the grooming
category. In particular, we focus on disposable razor products to avoid the complications that
the tied-goods nature of demand poses for modeling in other razor products.
The sample covers 6 brands in 81 stores (across 7 counties in the Chicago metropolitan
area) for 104 weeks. Gillette is the dominant brand with an average share of 59.5% of the total
number of razors sold in each market (which we dene as a store) and time period (dened as a
week) combination. DFF private label is the second biggest-selling brand with an average share
of 20.6%, followed by Shick (14.0%) and BIC (5.6%). Personna and Wilkinson Sword have very
residual average market shares.
We dene a product on the basis of two attributes: gender segment (men or women) and
brand so that, for example, Schick Slim Twin and Schick Slim Twin Women are classied as
distinct products. Women products account for an average share of 17.3% of the total number of
razors sold in every market and time period. The choice set available to consumers is relatively
limited. Although the sample covers 30 products, DFF stores carry only an average of 13.2
di¤erent products in each store/week combination. In contrast with the substantial brand
concentration, at the product level there is slightly more fragmentation. Gillette Good News is
the market leader with an average share of 14.2% of the weekly total number of razors sold in
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each store.
Each product is typically o¤ered in several package sizes, with the top four sizes accounting
for an average share of more than 99% of the weekly total number of razors sold in each store:
10 razors packages (41.5%), 5 razors packages (41.4%), 12 razors packages (11.3%) and 15 razors
packages (5.2%). A product-package size combination denes an UPC. The sample covers 56
UPCs and DFF stores carry an average of 17.3 di¤erent UPCs in each store/week combination.
Table 1 details the volume market shares for the top-6 brands, products and package sizes.
Appendix B describes the dataset in more detail and the di¤erent price discrimination features
of the price variable that must be incorporated into the structural model and justify the quarterly
aggregation of the original data.
Step 0: Model Consumer Demand
The supply-side of our empirical structural methodology outlined in the previous section relies
on the ability to consistently estimate own- and cross-price e¤ects in step 0. Here, we introduce
the consumers utility function and the assumptions of the demand side of the model. We
model consumer demand using the multinomial random-coe¢ cients Logit model in the lines of
McFadden and Train (2000), where consumers are assumed to purchase at most one unit of one
of the products available in the market. We consider a di¤erentiated products setting similar to
Berry et al. (1995, hereafter BLP). The estimation approach allows for consumer heterogeneity
and controls for price endogeneity.
The Setup
In each market m 2   f1; : : : ;Mg (here dened as a store) and time period t (here dened
as a quarter), there are Imt consumers, indexed by i, each of which chooses among Jmt UPC
alternatives. Let j = 1; : : : ; Jmt index the inside UPC alternatives to the consumer in market
m and period t. The no purchase choice (outside alternative) is indexed by j = 0.
Consumer Flow Utility
The consumer ow utility is expressed in terms of the indirect utility from each of the available
alternatives. We begin by specifying the indirect utility from choosing an inside alternative.
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The utility derived by consumer i from purchasing UPC j in market m and period t is assumed
to be of the form:
uijmt = uijmt
 
pjmt; qj ; xjmt; wm; jmt

+ "ijmt
= ipjmt + ' (qj) + ixjmt +  iwm + jmt + "ijmt;
where pjmt denotes the price of UPC j in market m and period t, qj denotes the number of
disposable razors included (package size) in UPC j, xjmt denotes a Kx-dimensional vector of
observed characteristics of UPC j in market m and period t (observed by the consumer and
the econometrician), wmt denotes a Kw-dimensional vector of observed characteristics of the
competitive environment of each market m (and potentially period t) to account for variations
in the shopping alternatives that consumers have for making their purchases, and jmt denotes
the mean utility derived from the unobserved characteristics of UPC j in market m and period
t (observed by the consumer, but unobserved by the econometrician), which may be potentially
correlated with price. Finally, "ijmt is a random shock to consumer choice. i denotes consumer
is price sensitivity. i denotes the parameters representing consumer is preference for the
observed characteristics included in the vector xjmt, and  i denotes consumer is valuation of
shopping alternatives.
Disposable razor products come in several package sizes and prices are typically nonlinear
in size. ' (qj) denotes the component of the utility function associated to package size. We
assume non-linear functional forms for ' (qj). Following McManus (2007), a linear specication
for both price and package size would be inappropriate. If the marginal utility from increasing
size is constant, given that price schedules are typically concave in size, then (if the random
shock is omitted from the model) all consumers with su¢ ciently high valuation to purchase a
small size would prefer a larger size to the small one.
The estimation approach allows for general parameter heterogeneity. In particular, we allow
for observed and unobserved heterogeneity in price sensitivity, i:
i = + di + vi;
where di is a vector of demographic variables and vi is a vector of random-variables drawn from
a normalized multivariate normal distribution that allows for unobserved heterogeneity.  is a
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vector of parameters that represent how price sensitivity varies with demographics, while  is
a scaling vector. We allow for price sensitivity to depend on the age of the consumer, as well
as on her household size and annual household income. For the remaining parameters, we have
i =  and  i =  .
We now move on to specify the indirect utility from not purchasing. The utility derived by
consumer i from this outside option in market m and period t is assumed to be of the form:
ui0mt = ui0mt (0mt) + "i0mt
= 0mt + 0di + 0vi + "i0mt;
where 0mt denotes the mean utility derived from not purchasing in market m/period t combi-
nation and "i0mt is a random shock to consumer choice. Because utility is ordinal, the preference
relation is invariant to positive monotonic transformations. As a consequence, the model pa-
rameters are identiable up to a scalar, which implies that a normalization is required. The
standard practice is to normalize the mean utility of the outside option, 0mt, to zero.
Having described the indirect utility from the di¤erent alternatives available to the consumer,
we now address her maximization problem: consumers are assumed to purchase one unit of the
alternative that yields the highest utility. Because consumers are heterogeneous (di, vi, "imt),
the set of consumers that choose UPC j in market m and period t is given by:
Ajmt = f(di; vi; "imt) juijmt  uilmt8l = 0; 1; : : : ; Jmtg ;
where "im = ("i0mt; : : : ; "iJmtmt). If we assume a zero probability of ties, the aggregate market
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where P  (d; v; "t) denotes the population distribution function of the consumer types (di; vi; "imt).
We assume d, v and "t to be independent. The last equality is just a consequence of this as-
sumption. Having computed the aggregate market shares, the aggregate demand of UPC j in




Having described the consumer demand model, we address the estimation procedure. We esti-
mate the parameters of the demand model assuming the empirical distribution of demographics
for P d (d), independent normal distributions for P

v (v) and a Type I extreme value distribution
for P " ("t). The latter assumption allows us to integrate the "s analytically which implies that
the unobserved characteristics, , constitute the only source of sampling error. This gives an
explicit structural interpretation to the error term and, thereby, circumvents the critique pro-
vided by Brown and Walker (1989) related to the addition of ad-hoc errors and their induced
correlations. After integrating the "s, the aggregate market share of UPC j in market m and








dP d (d) dP

v (v) :
We estimated the parameters of the model by following the algorithm used by BLP and
Nevo (2000). The general estimation procedure involves searching for the parameters that
equate observed and predicted aggregated market shares at the market/period level.
Price Endogeneity and Identication
The pricing decision of rms takes into account all characteristics of a UPC. This introduces
correlation between prices and UPC characteristics and, in particular, between prices and the
unobserved UPC characteristics (that constitute the structural error term of the demand model).
As a consequence, instrumental variable techniques are required for consistent estimation. Con-
trolling for the (market- and time period-invariant) mean unobserved UPC characteristics and
for UPC-invariant market/time period deviations from that mean by using xed e¤ects decreases
the requirements on the instruments, since the correlation between prices and those specic un-
observed UPC characteristics is fully accounted for and does not require an instrument. In
order to understand why this is the case, note that we can model jmt = j + mt +jmt and
capture j and mt by UPC and market/time period xed e¤ects, where j denotes the (market-
and time period-invariant) mean valuation for the unobserved characteristics of UPC j and mt
denotes the UPC-invariant market and time period deviations from that mean. However, it
does not completely eliminate the need for instrumental variable techniques since UPC-specic
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market/period deviations from that mean jmt are still expected to be correlated with prices.
We now provide an informal discussion of identication. We have already noted that because
utility is ordinal, the preference relation is invariant to positive monotonic transformations. As
a consequence, the model parameters are identiable up to a scalar, which implies that a nor-
malization is required. Without loss of generality, we normalize the mean utility of the outside
option, 0mt, to zero. Given this restriction, the identication of the remaining parameters is
standard given a large enough sample. The xed e¤ects j and mt are identied from variation
in market shares across the di¤erent UPC and markets/time periods, respectively. The taste
parameters  and the parameters in ' (qj) are identied from variations in the observed UPC
characteristics and package sizes. The mean value of the price coe¢ cient, , is identied from
variation in prices. The competition environment coe¢ cients,  , are identied from variation in
the number of grocery stores, convenience stores and pharmacies across ZIP codes. The para-
meters in vector  are identied from variation in demographics across ZIP codes and, nally,
the parameters in vector  are identied from variation in market shares due to unobserved
factors.9
Because of price endogeneity, it will be appropriate to use instruments rather than the
variation in the actual prices to empirically identify the models parameters. We follow Davis
and Huse (2010) in using three types of instruments for the price of UPC j in market m and
period t. First, we use the median price of UPC j in quarter t across stores in other counties,
in the lines of Hausman et al. (1994, hereafter HLZ). Second, we use the number of other own
rm UPCs and the number of rival rms UPCs that are o¤ered in that market and time period,
as well as the sum of package sizes of other own rm UPCs and the sum of package sizes of rival
rms UPCs that are o¤ered in that store/quarter combination, in the lines of BLP. Third, we
use the latter BLP-type instruments within the same gender segment, in the lines of Bresnahan
et al. (1997, hereafter BST): the number of other same segment and rm UPCs and the number
of same segment rival rms UPCs that are o¤ered in that market and time period, as well as
the sum of package sizes of other same segment and rm UPCs and the sum of package sizes of
same segment rival rms UPCs that are o¤ered in that store/quarter combination.
In order for an instrument to be valid, it needs to be simultaneously (1) correlated with
the endogenous variable price pjmt and (2) uncorrelated with the unobserved UPC character-
9Note that 0 and 0 are not identied separately from an intercept in uijmt that varies with consumer
characteristics.
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istics variations jmt. The validity of the former condition can be tested by regressing the
endogenous variable on the full set of instruments: the instruments excluded from the demand
equation plus all the exogenous explanatory variables in the demand equations (the F -test of
the joint signicance of the excluded instruments constitutes a statistic commonly used for such
test). The validity of the latter condition is more di¢ cult to test and, although, if the demand
equations are over-identied (the number of excluded instruments exceeds the number of in-
cluded endogenous variables), the overidentifying restrictions may be tested via the J statistic
of Hansen (1982), there are limits to the extent to which the uncorrelation condition in itself
can be tested in an entirely convincingly way.
Consumer Demand Estimation Results
Table 2 presents the demand estimation results, with the di¤erent columns reporting distinct
specications that vary on both the covariates included, the estimation procedure and the type
of price instruments. Specication (1) reports the results of an ordinary least squares standard
multinomial Logit model regression. This rst specication includes price, demographic and
competition variables as covariates. Furthermore, we consider a quadratic functional form for
' (qj) and introduce heterogeneity by interacting price with observable demographic charac-
teristics. The coe¢ cients on these di¤erent covariates are all of the expected sign but mostly
statistically insignicant. The price coe¢ cient is one example of the latter, suggesting that the
average consumer is price insensitive. The interactions with household size and consumer age
are also statistically insignicant suggesting that these observed demographics do not explain
price sensitiveness. The interaction with household income is, however, highly signicant indi-
cating that households with higher income are less price sensitive. The coe¢ cients on package
size suggest that consumers value package size at a statistically signicant decreasing rate. Fi-
nally, the coe¢ cients on demographic and competition covariates are statistically insignicant.
This indicates that the utility of purchasing (and not purchasing) is not explained by the ob-
served demographics nor impacted by the number of nearby grocery, convenience stores and
pharmacies.
The structural error term of specication (1) includes the full jmt since the specication
does not include any control of the unobserved characteristics. In specication (2), we include
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UPC xed e¤ects in order to fully control for j .
10 This increases the absolute value of the price
coe¢ cient, which suggests that prices may be positively correlated with the mean valuation of
the unobserved UPC characteristics, which will underestimate consumer price sensitivity if not
accounted for. We interpret the e¤ects on the price coe¢ cient as evidence that controlling for
j matters. The price coe¢ cient suggests that the average consumer is in fact price sensitive.
The interactions with household size and consumer age remain statistically insignicant indi-
cating that these observed demographics do not explain price sensitiveness. The interaction
with household income remains, however, highly signicant suggesting that households with
higher income are less price sensitive. While most demographic covariates remain statistically
insignicant, the coe¢ cient on age becomes statistically signicant indicating that the utility
of purchasing lowers with age. Finally, the coe¢ cients on the competition covariates seem to
suggest that the utility of not purchasing is higher with more nearby pharmacies in the area,
while the number of nearby grocery and convenience stores remain not to have a statistically
signicant impact.
Specication (2) controls for UPC xed e¤ects that capture the mean valuation of the
unobserved UPC. However, it does not fully control for jmt. The error term includes UPC-
invariant and UPC-specic market/time period deviations from that mean: mt and jmt,
respectively, both of which, as argued above, are taken into account in the pricing decision of
rms, introducing correlation with the price covariate. Specications (3), (5) and (7) report the
results of a generalized method of moments standard multinomial Logit model regression that
replicate specication (2) using each of the types of instruments described above to account
for the correlation between prices and unobserved characteristics: mt and jm. The e¤ect
on the price coe¢ cient seems sensitive to the choice of instruments. Although the rst stage
F -test of the joint signicance of the excluded instruments are statistically signicant for all
types of instruments, the tests of over-identication are rejected, suggesting that the identifying
assumptions are not valid.
In order to reduce the requirements on the instruments, we estimate specications (4), (6)
and (8) that include store- and quarter-xed e¤ects that control for mt, UPC-invariant market
and time period deviations from the valuation means. mt may be a function of unobserved
demographics, and if those unobserved demographics are correlated with prices, mt will be
10Moreover, this captures exible non-linearities in ' (qj).
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correlated with prices. The inclusion of these xed e¤ects increases the absolute value of the
price coe¢ cient, which suggests that prices may be positively correlated with mt, which will
underestimate consumer price sensitivity if not accounted for. We interpret the e¤ects on the
price coe¢ cient as evidence that controlling for mt matters. The rst stage F -test of the
joint signicance of the excluded instruments are, again, statistically signicant for all types
of instruments. Controlling for the unobserved demographics via mt eliminates the omitted-
variable bias and improves the over-identication test statistic. In the case of the BLP type
instruments, the improvement is such that the instruments are no longer rejected, suggesting
that the BLP identifying assumption is valid. We explored the sensitivity of our results to
the inclusion of market/time period xed e¤ects and all the main coe¢ cients were found to
be robust. In order to avoid increasing unnecessarily the dimensionality of our problem, we
controlled for mt using store- and quarter-xed e¤ects.
Finally, specication (9) reports the results for the full multinomial random-coe¢ cients Logit
model with BLP type instruments. The results suggest that the average consumer is price sen-
sitive. The interaction with household income is, once again, statistically signicant conrming
that households with higher income are less price sensitive. The remaining interactions with
household size and consumer age are statistically insignicant indicating that these observed
demographics do not explain price sensitiveness. The standard deviations coe¢ cients are also
statistically insignicant, which suggests that most of the heterogeneity is due to demographics.
Table 3 reports a sample of the estimated median (across the 643 store-quarter combinations)
own- and cross-price elasticities computed according to the estimates from specication (9) in
Table 2. The average (across the 56 UPCs) of the median of the estimates of the own-price
elasticity is -8.9. While such elasticities may seem relatively high, when one takes into account
the fact that there is a large number of UPCs typically produced by large multiproduct rms,
the elasticities seem quite reasonable. If we were to look at own-price elasticities across products
or brands, considering the cross-price elasticities of all the other UPCs that the company owns,
the magnitudes would be lower. The average of the median of the estimates of the cross-price
elasticity is 0.1. By a similar argument as above, while such elasticities may seem relatively low,




We now move on to predict and recover the marginal costs. The procedure makes use of equation
(7) that relies on the Bertrand-Nash behaviour described in Assumption 5, on the current
ownership structure established in matrix Lpre, and on the ability to consistently estimate the
own- and cross-price e¤ects required to compute the elements of matrix 
ne;premt .
The vectors pne;premt and smt (p
ne;pre
mt ) are observed in the data. The own- and cross-price
e¤ects required to compute the elements of matrix b
ne;premt are estimated within the demand
model (Table 3 provides a sample of the estimated price-elasticities). Matrix Lpre is computed,
under Assumptions 1-4 and 9, using each rms distribution of total and voting stock. Table
4 presents this distribution for the ownership structure of the di¤erent rms from March 22,
1993 onwards according to 1994s Schedule 14A (proxy statement) information reported by each
rm.
In the context of our illustrative application, the recovered marginal costs, cmcprejmt, include
any incremental cost required for the manufacturer rm to produce, distribute and make avail-
able one additional pack of disposable razors to the nal consumer. In the lines of Nevo (2001)
and consistently with a wide variety of models of manufacturer-retailer interaction, this cost
can be expressed as follows:
cmcprejmt = cmcpre;manjmt + cmcpre;retjmt + dmarginpre;retjmt ;
where cmcpre;manjmt denotes the pre-partial acquisition manufacturers marginal cost of producing
the additional pack of product j in time period t and transporting it from the plant to the
retailer store (market) m, cmcpre;retjmt denotes the pre-partial acquisition retailers marginal cost
of getting the additional pack to the store shelves and selling it, and nally, dmarginpre;retjmt
denotes the pre-partial acquisition retailer markup over the acquisition cost.
The rst two columns of Table 5 present price and recovered marginal costs for a sample
of UPCs. Given that those variables vary by UPC, market and time period, we present the
median for each selected UPC across the 643 store-quarter combinations. The median price and
recovered marginal cost is $3:02 and $2:59, respectively. The third column of Table 5 presents
the recovered marginal costs as a percentage of price, with the median marginal cost to sale
price ratio being 85:8%.
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In order to evaluate the reasonability of our results, we decompose the recovered (predicted)
marginal cost using the gross retail margin (to capture dmarginpre;retjmt ), a variable not used in
the demand side estimation for exactly this purpose. This decomposition is presented, with the
obvious exception of private labels, in columns four and ve of Table 5. The median markup,
excluding private labels, corresponds to 36:6% of price, yielding that the manufacturers mar-
ginal cost of producing the additional pack, transporting it from the plant to the retailer store,
getting it to the store shelves and nally selling it correspond to the remaining 51:6% of price.
We now address the decomposition of this markup between manufacturer and retailer. Accord-
ing to the Department of Commerces Annual Retail Trade Survey, which provides national
estimates of (among others) total annual sales and total operating expenses for retail businesses
located in the United States, grocery storess marginal cost of getting the additional pack to
the shelves and selling it account for around 4:2% of price.11 This includes costs (some of
which can be argued not to be marginal costs) with temporary labour, packaging materials,
containers and other materials, electricity, transportation, shipping and warehousing services,
and advertising and promotional services. This implies an average manufacturers marginal cost
of producing an additional pack and transporting it from the plant to the retailer store of 47:4%
of price. We compare this marginal cost estimate with the accounting estimates supported
by 1994s Annual Report of the two biggest-selling brands (excluding private labels). Gillette
and Warner-Lamberts production and distribution costs account for 62:7% (blades & razors
business segment) and 72:0% (consumer health care industry segment) of the corresponding
manufacturer price, respectively. If we were to use the ratio between the sale price and the
manufacturer price (DFFs average acquisition cost computed using the gross retail margin) to
re-scale the percentages in terms of the sale price, we would conclude that Gillette and Warner-
Lamberts production and distribution costs account for 40:3% and 44:8% of the sale price, a
value reasonably close to our results. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that disposable
razor products typically sell at a lower margin than the remaining razor products, making the
accounting estimates above a conservative one.
11We use data for detailed operating expenses as a percentage of sales referent to 2009 as a crude measure. We
argue that this ratio may have had a similar path to the annual gross margin as a percentage of sales, that data
shows to have been relatively stable ratio from 1993-2010.
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Pre-Partial Acquisition Analysis
After recovering the vector of pre-partial acquisition (implied) marginal costs,dmcpremt , we address
the issue of evaluating the sustainability of a coordinated outcome as a tacit non-cooperative
equilibrium in that industry setting. In a typical competition policy issue, we would begin to
do so by computing the vector of prices under the two discussed alternative individual behavior
strategies: coordination and defection, since under grim-trigger strategies, established in As-
sumption 6, the vector of pre-partial acquisition punishment (Bertrand-Nash reversion) prices
are directly observable and no counterfactual simulation is required. It is possible, however, to
adjust the methodology to t the specicities of the data used in the demand estimation (step
0). This is the case of our empirical illustration. The shareholder structure of Wilkinson Sword
in the pre-partial acquisition setting is independent of the remaining rms in the industry. This
mimics the industry ownership structure before December 20, 1989. Because our dataset ranges
from July 1994 to June 1996, we are required to compute the counterfactual pre-partial acqui-
sition vector of prices under all three alternative individual behavior strategies: coordination,
defection and punishment. We already discussed the procedure to simulate collusion and defec-
tion prices. The details to derive the pre-partial acquisition Bertrand-Nash equilibrium price
vector are given in Appendix A.
Table 6 reports the pre-partial acquisition median simulated prices under the three alter-
native individual behavior strategies for a sample of UPCs across all markets (DFF stores).
The results suggest that if rms were able to coordinate successfully, median prices would in-
crease 3:92% compared with the ones arising in a Bertrand-Nash competitive setting. This
price increase is relatively larger for smaller rms, indicating that those tend to benet more
from the full internalization induced by coordination. The defection prices simulations suggest
that the incentive to defect is non-negligible: each deviant rm undercuts coordinated prices
considerably, to a level close to that of the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium.
After simulating the counterfactual vector of prices under all three alternative individual
behavior strategies (coordination, defection and punishment), we use it as input to examine the
pre-partial acquisitions market shares, static (annual) operating prot and, particularly, the
static (annual) aggregated prot of each rm. Table 7 presents the aggregated prots gain from






c;pre;D)   f (pne;pre;D), respectively. The results were computed as follows for each
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alternative individual behavior strategy. The rst step consisted in computing, for each rm,
the operating prots for each market (store) m, which we then aggregated across all markets.
The second step consisted in extrapolating the results for the US economy as a whole. In
order to do so, we computed, for each rm, the average operating prot across the di¤erent
markets and multiplied the result by the US economy yearly potential market. The third step
consisted of using equation (2) to compute the aggregated prot of each rm. Finally, we used
the aggregated prot computed under each three alternative individual behavior strategies, to
derive the gain from deviating and the loss from punishment.
The results are consistent with the theoretical literature on the impact of rm asymmetry
on the likelihood of coordination: Compte et al. (2002), Vasconcelos (2005) and Kuhn (2004).
First, that in the absence of biding capacity constraints, smaller rms tend to be maverick rms,
i.e., smaller rms tend to have the greatest incentive to deviate, (e.g., American Safety Razor
and Wilkinson Sword) since they tend to be the ones that benet the most from disrupting a co-
ordinating agreement (18% and 15% of the static coordinated aggregated prots, respectively).
Second, that larger rms (e.g., Gillette) will have a lower incentive to punish since they tend to
be the ones that su¤er the greatest loss in punishing (5% of the static coordinated aggregated
prot).
Combining the gain from deviating and the loss from punishments results, we derive the
critical threshold for the discount factor that satises the no-deviation condition of each rm,
presented in the last column of Table 7. The critical threshold that supports a coordinated out-
come as a tacit non-cooperative equilibrium is given by the maximum of those critical thresh-
olds. The results suggest that the binding incentive compatibility constraint is the one regarding
American Safety Razor: 0:888. In order to assess the coordinated e¤ects of partial ownership
arrangements, we propose to evaluate whether a proposed acquisitions changes that critical
threshold.
Post-Partial Acquisition Analysis
We now assess the e¤ect of several (actual and hypothetical) partial acquisitions on the likelihood
of a collusive outcome. In particular, we investigate the impact of the following acquisitions:
1. (counterfactual): The Gillette Company acquires a 100% voting equity interest in Wilkin-
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son Sword. This constitutes an hypothetical ownership structure and it is presented to
illustrate the counterfactual market outcomes if Gillette did not voluntarily rescinded the
acquisition of Eemlands wet shaving razor blade business in the United States.
2. (counterfactual): The Gillette Company acquires a 22.9% nonvoting equity interest in
Wilkinson Sword. This mimics the industry ownership structure from December 20, 1989
to March 22, 1993.
3. (counterfactual): The Gillette Company acquires a 22.9% voting equity interest in Wilkin-
son Sword. This constitutes an hypothetical ownership structure and it is presented here
to illustrate the di¤erential impact of acquiring a voting and nonvoting equity interest.
4. (1994 actual situation): Warner-Lambert Company acquires a 100% voting equity interest
in Wilkinson Sword. This constitutes a full merger and mimics the industry ownership
structure from March 22, 1993 onwards.
We begin the analysis by computing the vector of prices under the two discussed post-
partial acquisition alternative individual behavior strategies: defection and punishment, given
that assuming the partial-acquisition does not alter the competitive setting among rms nor
the vector of marginal costs, coordinated prices do not depend, following Assumption 7, on the
actual ownership structure.12
Table 8 reports the median simulated percentage variation in punishment (Bertrand-Nash)
and defection prices relative to the pre-acquisition case for a sample of UPCs across all DFF
stores. Case 1s counterfactual, presented in column two, examines the impact (when com-
pared with the baseline, preacquisition, case) of the 100% voting equity interest acquisition in
Wilkinson Sword initially proposed by Gillette, against which the Department of Justice (DoJ)
instituted a civil proceeding. The complaint alleged that the e¤ect of the acquisition by Gillette
may have been substantially to lessen competition in the sale of wet shaving razor blades in the
United States and shortly after the case was led, Gillette voluntarily rescinded the acquisition
of Eemlands wet shaving razor blade business in the United States. The simulated Bertrand-
Nash (punishment) price increases are, however, low: 9:3% and 7:2% for WS Colors and WS
12Case 4 constitutes an exception. It only requires the computation of the vector of each rms defection
prices since, under grim-trigger strategies, established in Assumption 6, the vector of punishment (Bertrand-
Nash reversion) prices are directly observable (because our dataset ranges from July 1994 to June 1996) and no
counterfactual simulation is required.
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Ultra Glide, respectively. The defection price increases, as inferred by the pre-partial acquisi-
tion analysis, mirror the punishment ones: 9:9% and 7:7%, respectively, since each deviant rm
undercuts coordinated prices to a level close to that of the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium.
Case 2s counterfactual, presented in column three, examines the impact (when compared
with the baseline case) of the 22:9% nonvoting equity interest acquisition in Wilkinson Sword by
Gillette. The DoJ allowed this acquisition after being assured that this stake would be passive.
However, even when the acquiring rm cannot inuence the conduct of the target rm, the
partial acquisition of a nancial interest in a rival may still reduce the incentive of the acquiring
rm to compete aggressively because it shares in the losses thereby inicted on that rival. We
examine this question. The results conrm the reasonability of the DoJ decision. The simulated
variation in Bertrand-Nash prices is extremely low: smaller than 0:001% for both WS Colors
and WS Ultra Glide, a variation, once again, mirrored by the simulations for the defection
prices.
Case 3s counterfactual, presented in column four, examines the impact (when compared
with the baseline case) of a 22:9% voting equity interest acquisition in Wilkinson Sword by
the Gillette Company. When a rm acquires a voting interest in a rival, it acquires the ability
to inuence the competitive conduct of the target rm. Such inuence can lessen competition
because it may be used to induce the rival to compete less aggressively against the acquiring
rm. We expect the impact of, in addition to a nancial interest, acquiring a voting interest to
lessen competition to a greater extent when compared with the sole acquisition of a nancial
interest. The Bertrand-Nash (punishment) price increases conrm this expectation: 2:7% and
2:1% for WS Colors and WS Ultra Glide, respectively. The variation in defection prices is
simulated to undergo, as before, a similar path.
Finally, case 4s counterfactual, presented in the last column, examines the impact (when
compared with the baseline case) of a 100% voting equity interest acquisition in Wilkinson Sword
by the Warner-Lambert Company. The acquisition was prompted after the European Commis-
sion ordered the Gillette Company to sell its stake in Eemland because of antitrust concerns.
The concern was focused particularly on Europe where Wilkinson Sword was a stronger player
than in the US. Consistently with traditional merger analysis, a merger between rms selling
di¤erentiated products may diminish competition by enabling the merged rm to prot by uni-
laterally raising price. The simulated Bertrand-Nash (punishment) price increases are however
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relatively low: 1:6% and 1:3% for WS Colors and WS Ultra Glide, respectively. Interestingly,
the quantitative impact of a full merger with a smaller player (the Warner-Lambert Company)
on WSs prices is relatively similar to a 22:9% partial voting acquisition by a larger player (the
Gillette Company). The defection price increases, once again, mirror the punishment ones.
After simulating the counterfactual vector of punishment and defection prices, we use them
(jointly with the vector of coordinated prices computed in the pre-partial acquisition industry
setting) as an input to examine the corresponding static (annual) operating prot and aggre-
gated prot of each rm. Table 9, Panels A and B present the post-acquisition median simulated
percentage variation in aggregated prots gain from deviating and loss from punishment for
each rm f 2 =. The results suggest that (partial or full) acquisitions tend to decrease both
the per-period benet of maintaining the coordinated agreement (panel B) and the one-shot net
gain from deviating from such an arrangement (panel A). The combination of these two impacts
yields a decrease in the discount factors critical threshold of acquiring rms, while an increase
in the critical discount factors corresponding to the remaining rms. The critical threshold that
supports a collusive outcome as a tacit non-cooperative equilibrium is given by the maximum
of those critical thresholds. The results suggest that, in the counterfactuals under analysis, this
critical threshold (referent to American Safety Razor) increases slightly, indicating that tacit
coordination in the post-(partial or full) acquisition industry is less likely to be sustained. This
result is consistent with Davis and Huse (2010)s ndings that, ceteris paribus, the incentives
to collude often fall as a result of an acquisition.
4 Conclusions
This article considers an empirical structural methodology to examine quantitatively the coordi-
nated e¤ects of partial acquisitions involving pure nancial interests and/or e¤ective corporate
control on the range of discount factors for which coordination can be sustained. The proposed
methodology can deal with di¤erentiated products industries, with both direct and indirect
partial ownership interests and nests full mergers (100% nancial and control acquisitions) as
a special case.
We assume a setting where oligopolistic rms interact repeatedly, by playing an innite
sequence of ordinary games over time and across markets. We model the oligopolistic ordinary
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static game taking into account asymmetric multi- and di¤erentiated-product rms and partial
ownership interests that may or may not correspond to control. We propose a procedure to
simulate rmscounterfactual static prots under alternative individual behavior (maintain the
coordinated arrangement, unilaterally defect from the coordinated arrangement, and punish the
defections of a rival), which are then incorporated in the repeated game to identify the minimal
threshold for the discount factor that sustains collusion. This structural approach to partial
acquisitions may be a preferable method for competition policy issues to the current indirect
methods focused on measures of market concentration and on informal analysis of the features
of the market conducive to coordinated interaction.
We also provide an empirical application of the methodology to several acquisitions in the
wet shaving industry. A DoJ challengeds proposed full acquisition of Wilkinson Sword by
Gillette in 1989, voluntarily rescinded due to antitrust concerns in favor of a (not-challenged)
partial acquisition of 22.9% nonvoting equity interest in 1990, and nally the full merger between
Warner-Lambert and Wilkinson Sword in 1993, prompted after the European Commission or-
dered Gillette Company to sell its stake in Wilkinson Sword. The results seem to conrm the
DoJ challenge of the initial proposal in the sense it would have induced a steeper increase in
the likelihood of coordinated conduct than the 22.9% passive nal participation. The results
seem also to conrm Gillette version in saying that its reason for participating in Wilkinson
Sword was non-nancial in the sense that the estimated incremental impact of the acquisition
for Gillette prots seems relatively low. And nally, the results seem also to suggest that the
Warner-Lambert and Wilkinson Sword merger prompted for antitrust concerns, was, in fact,
detrimental in the sense it increased, although only slightly, the strength of coordinated conduct.
This article leaves many issues yet to be explored. Extensions of this methodology to Abreu
(1986, 1988)s optimal punishments, to not all-inclusive coordination agreements and to partial
vertical acquisitions constitute very interesting potential areas for future research.
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Pre-Partial Acquisition Counterfactual Static Prices and Prots
Coordination







. Following the objective function equation (5) and under Assumption


















(pjmt  mcjmt) mtsjmt (pfmt;p fmt)  Cfmt;
where the second equivalence makes use of the fact that because rms act collectively, the typical
element of matrix Lc is given by lcfg = 1, for any f; g 2 =. The reason being that, under full
tacit coordination, each rm internalizes the e¤ects of price changes on the operating prots of
all rms in the industry.
The rst-order conditions yield that the price pjmt of any product j in each market m and





















We can make use of the above set of rst-order conditions to solve for each marketms subset
of the predicted (counterfactual) pre-partial acquisition price vector under tacit coordination,
bpc;pret . The procedure uses step 0s demand estimates to evaluate the own- and cross-price
e¤ects for any two products r and j, the marginal costs recovered in step 2, and the Jmt  Jmt
tacit collusion ownership structure matrix as follows:13
bsmt (p̂c;premt )  b
c;premt (bpc;premt ) (bpc;premt  dmcpremt ) = 0;
13Note that b
c;premt does not necessarily imply that price e¤ects are invariant to the ownership structure in




c;premt denotes the matrix with jr element given by b
c;premt;rj =  c@srmt (bpc;premt ) =@pjmt.
After solving for bpc;pret , we can then use it as input, given that the model is structural, to
examine the market shares, the operating prot and, particularly, the static aggregated prot
of each rm f 2 =: ft (bpc;pret ;D), a structural element of the above no-deviation conditions.
Defection
In face of a coordinated agreement, individual rms may be tempted to increase static prot
for a period or so by deviating from the arrangement. We now address the individual defection







Following Bernheim and Whinston (1990), given that in any multimarket coordination equilib-
rium, rms know that deviations will be punished in all markets (Abreu, 1988), if a rm decides


































The rst-order conditions yield that the price pjmt of any product j 2  fmt in each market


















Let Jfmt denote the number of products j 2  fmt produced by rm f in period t and market
m. We can make use of the above Jfmt set of conditions to solve for each market msubset
of the pre-partial acquisition predicted (counterfactual) price vector under deviation by rm f ,
bpdffg;pret = bpd;preft ; bpc;pre ft . As before, the procedure uses step 0s demand estimates, step 2s
recovered marginal costs and the Jfmt  Jmt structure matrix as follows:
Gdffg;prebsmt bpdffg;premt   b
dffg;premt bpdffg;premt bpdffg;premt  dmcpremt  = 0;
where
dffg;pret denotes a matrix with jr element given by b
dffg;premt;rj =  lprefg c@srmt bpdffg;premt  =@pjmt
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and Gdffg;pre denotes the matrix with diagonal elements gjj = l
pre
ff for j 2  fmt, with l
pre
fg rep-
resenting the typical element of matrix Lpre=(I Cpre0) 1Cpre0Dpre (I Dpre) 1 computed
under the pre-partial acquisition (corporate control and nancial interest) shareholders weights.
Finally, after solving for bpdffg;pret , we can then, as before, use it as input, given that the
model is structural, to examine the market shares, the operating prot and, particularly, the
static aggregated prot of each deviating rm f 2 =: ft
bpdffg;pret ;D, a structural element
of the above no-deviation conditions.
4.0.1 Bertrand-Nash
The pre-partial acquisition Bertrand-Nash equilibrium price vector can be derived by choosing
bpne;premt to satisfy the following set of Jmt rst-order conditions for each market and time period:
Gne;prebsmt (bpne;premt )  b
ne;premt (bpne;premt ) (bpne;premt  dmcpremt ) = 0;
where b
ne;premt denotes a matrix with jr element given by b
ne;premt;rj =  lprefg c@srmt (bpne;premt ) =@pjmt
for r 2  gmt and j 2  fmt, and nally Gne;pre denotes a diagonal matrix with diagonal elements
gjj = l
pre
ff for j 2  fmt.
Post-Partial Acquisition Counterfactual Static Prices and Prots
Defection
Assuming the partial-acquisition does not alter the competitive setting among rms, we can
make use of the set of rst-order conditions in equation (9) to solve for each market ms subset
of the predicted (counterfactual) post-partial acquisition price vector under deviation by any
rm f 2 =, bpdffg;pstt . The procedure closely parallels the one for the pre-partial acquisition
structure as follows:
Gdffg;pstbsmt bpdffg;pstmt   b
dffg;pstmt bpdffg;pstmt bpdffg;pstmt  dmcpstmt = 0;









computed under the post-partial acquisition (corporate control and nancial interest) share-
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holders weights (actual or hypothetical), b
dffg;pstmt denotes a matrix with jr element given
by b
dffg;pstmt;rj =  lpstfgc@srmt bpdffg;pstmt  =@pjmt for r 2  gmt and j 2  fmt, and nally Gdffg;pst
denotes a diagonal matrix with diagonal elements gjj = l
pst
ff for j 2  fmt. After solving forbpdffg;pstt , we can then use it as input to examine the market shares, the operating prot and,
particularly, the static aggregated prot of each deviating rm f 2 =: ft
bpdffg;pstt ;D, a
structural element of the post-acquisition no-deviation conditions.
Punishment
The predicted (counterfactual) post-partial acquisition Bertrand-Nash equilibrium price vector,
bpne;pstt can be derived making use of the set of rst-order conditions in equation (7). Assuming
the partial-acquisition does not alter the competitive setting, the procedure uses step 0s demand
estimates to evaluate the own- and cross-price e¤ects for any two products r and j, the marginal
costs recovered in step 2 and the new post-partial acquisition Jmt Jmt ownership structure as
follows:
Gne;pstbsmt bpne;pstmt   b
ne;pstmt bpne;pstmt bpne;pstmt  dmcpstmt = 0;
where b
ne;pstmt denotes a matrix with jr element given by b
ne;pstmt;rj =  lpstfgc@srmt bpne;pstmt  =@pjmt
for r 2  gmt and j 2  fmt, and nally Gne;pst denotes a diagonal matrix with diagonal elements
gjj = l
pst
ff for j 2  fmt. As before, after solving for bpne;pstt , we can then use it as input to
examine the market shares, the operating prot and, particularly, the static aggregated prot
of each rm f 2 =: ft





An important question is obviously whether the dataset is representative of the whole population
buying disposable razor products. For purposes of Gillette 22.9% nonvoting equity interest
acquisition in Eemland, the Department of Justice (1990) characterized the industry as follows:
Gillette accounts for 50% of all razor blade units (...). The next closest competitor
is BIC with 20%, followed by Warner-Lambert with 14%, Wilkinson with 3%, and
American Safety Razor with less than 1% of unit sales. (page 9)
Because this industry characterization does not account for private labels, we must be cau-
tious in a straightforward comparison with our dataset. However, it does suggest that our data
is reasonably representative, although slightly overrepresenting Gillette and underrepresenting
BIC and Wilkinson Sword.
We now move on to describe the dataset in more detail. Table B1, Panel A presents summary
purchase statistics at the UPC level. Although there is evidence of substantial heterogeneity
across stores and weeks, the median store in the sample sells 2 packages of 5 men razors per
week at a price of $3.10 per package, generating 38.9% gross retail margin. This margin is
computed with reference to the average acquisition cost of the items in inventory, an issue
we will address in more detail below. Table B1, Panel B presents summary statistics at the
store level. 17,539 households visit and purchase something in the median store per week. The
potential market size in a given time period is dened in terms of the number of purchases of
razor packages and assumed to be proportional to the weekly number of household visits of
each store. The proportionality factor is assumed to be the percentage of households buying
razor products times the probability of a purchase in any given visit. According to the IRI
Builders Suite (Bronnenberg et al., 2008) 28.5% of US households purchase razor blades in a
year, with an average purchase cycle of 106 days. Furthermore, according to Food & Beverage
Marketing (Degeratu et al., 2000), US households visit regular grocery stores about 7.9 times
per month on the average. This translates into a median potential market size of 181.7 package
purchases per store and week, a potential market that a median of 7 grocery stores, 3 convenience
stores and 5 pharmacies compete for each week. We explored the sensitivity of our results to
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the proportionality factor assumption and all the main conclusions were found to be robust.
Finally, Table B1, Panel C presents summary demographic statistics of each store surrounding
area (same ZIP code). The median consumer is 40-year-old within an household consisting of
two members and an annual income of $57,457.
Having described the main data summary statistics, we now examine in more detail the price
variable. Temporary price promotions are important marketing tools in the pricing strategy of
many nondurable goods and disposable razors are no exception, as the high price variance and
the (occasional) negative gross retail margin reported in Table B1, Panel A suggest. Prices in the
sample display a classic high-low pattern: products have a regular level that remains constant
for long periods of time with occasional temporary reductions. High-low pricing allows rms
to discriminate between (i) informed and uninformed consumers; (ii) consumers with di¤erent
inventory holding costs; and (iii) price-sensitive switchers and store-loyal consumers. While
the classic high-low pattern is easy to spot, regular price levels are hard to dene because they
may change over time. We dene a temporary price promotion in the lines of Dossche et al.
(2010): as any sequence of prices that is below at least 95 percent of the most left and the most
right adjacent prices. Table B2 characterizes DFFs temporary price promotions. Following
the typical pattern of setting regular price levels that remain constant for long periods of time,
the median prices set by this supermarket chain across all UPCs, stores and weeks are non-
promoted. Occasional temporary reductions account for only 11.5% of all price observations
and, although there is evidence of substantial heterogeneity, consist of a median 20.8% discount
every 4 weeks.
In an environment characterized by temporary price discounts, it is important to examine
how consumers respond to price cuts. As Hendel and Nevo (2006a) show, demand estimation
based on temporary price reductions may mismeasure the long-run responsiveness to prices.
This is of fundamental importance in a setting like ours that relies on the ability to consistently
estimate own- and cross-price elasticities. The rst two columns in Table B3 addresses this issue
by comparing, per package size, the percentage of weeks that a UPC was on promotion and the
percentage of razors sold during those weeks. The results suggest that consumers do respond
to temporary price discounts: the percentage of quantity sold on promotion is larger than the
percentage of weeks that the promoted price is available. This is consistent with the hypothesis
that consumers respond to temporary price cuts by accelerating (anticipating) purchases and
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hold inventories for future consumption (i.e. stockpile). The main alternative explanation that
consumers simply increase their consumption in response to a price reduction is less valid in the
wet shaving setting. In order to avoid mismeasuring the long-run responsiveness to prices due
to temporary price reductions, we aggregate the data quarterly.
Having characterized the price discrimination induced by temporary price promotions, we
now address a second form of discrimination: discrimination induced by price nonlinearity in
package size. Nonlinear pricing can be used by oligopolistic rms as a screening mechanism to
price discriminate between types of consumers that hold private information about their tastes
by nudging consumers to self-select (according to their tastes) into a given price-package size
combination. Disposable razors are once again no exception. Prices in the sample display a
non-linear schedule in package size, which is reported in Table B3. The last column of the table
presents the quantity discount associated with the biggest-selling package sizes. In a context
where not all products are sold in all package sizes and all DFFs stores, we analyzed the
nonlinearity in package size in the lines of Hendel and Nevo (2006b), using a regression of the
price per 5 razors on size dummy variables, controlling for temporary price promotions as well
as product and store xed e¤ects. The quantity discount of each package size is then computed
as the ratio of the coe¢ cient on the corresponding size dummy variable to the constant. The
results show that prices do exhibit quantity discounting. As a consequence, price nonlinearity
constitutes a feature of the market that must be incorporated into the structural model.
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Table 1
Volume Market Shares (%)*
Mean Median Std Min Max
Panel A: Brand Level
1. G Gillette 59.538 61.538 14.737 0.000 95.037
2. PL Private Label 20.562 18.634 10.837 0.000 100.000
3. WL Schick 14.043 12.753 8.832 0.000 66.154
4. B BIC 5.551 0.000 14.392 0.000 93.776
5. ASR Personna 0.275 0.000 0.770 0.000 11.990
6. WS Wilkinson Sword 0.032 0.000 0.314 0.000 9.284
Panel B: Product Level
1. G Good News 14.210 12.975 8.387 0.000 74.850
2. G Good News Plus 11.173 10.504 6.535 0.000 52.941
3. G Daisy Plus 9.553 8.467 6.767 0.000 45.455
4. WL Schick Slim Twin 8.832 7.634 6.988 0.000 56.893
5. G Good News Pivot Plus 6.959 6.094 5.313 0.000 48.980
6. G Good News Microtrac 6.891 6.061 5.552 0.000 54.545
Panel C: Package Size Level
1. 10 Razors 41.482 41.667 13.978 0.000 97.162
2. 5 Razors 41.438 40.650 13.348 2.080 100.000
3. 12 Razors 11.328 10.480 7.384 0.000 56.376
4. 15 Razors 5.247 0.000 10.677 0.000 71.942
5. 3 Razors 0.378 0.000 0.886 0.000 12.060
6. 2 Razors 0.121 0.000 0.556 0.000 11.538
* The statistics presented are computed across the 8,346 store-week combinations. Volume market
share denotes the percentage of the number of razors sold by brand, product and package size in the
total number of razors sold in each market. B: BIC, G: Gillette, ASR: American Safety Razor, PL:



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Principal Shareholders and Subsidiaries*
Shareholders Subsidiaries
Total Voting Total Voting
Stock Stock Stock Stock
American Safety Razor Company
Allsop Venture Partners III, LP 12.40 12.40
Goldman Sachs Group, LP 7.80 7.80
Scudder Stevens and Clarck 7.00 7.00
Equitable* 14.40 14.40
Grantham Mayo Van Otter 5.10 5.10
Leucadia Investors, Inc. 4.10 4.10
Mezzanine Capital and Income Trust 2001 PLC 2.00 2.00
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIC Corporation
Bruno Bich 77.70 77.70
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Warner-Lambert Company
The Capital Group, Inc. 5.16 5.16
Wilkinson Sword, Inc. 100.00 100.00
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The Gillette Company
Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. 10.90 10.70
* 1994s Schedule 14A (proxy statement) information. Equitable denotes the cumulative ownership of
Equitable Capital Partners, LP, Equitable Deal Flow Fund, LP, Equitable Capital Partners (Retirement
Fund), LP, and The Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States.
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Table 5
Pre-Partial Acquisition Median Recovered Marginal Costs*
mc decomposition
UPC price mc mc marginr mcm+r
($) (as a % price)
1. B Lady Shaver 10r 2.16 1.79 83.1 27.6 55.3
2. B Metal Shaver 5r 2.09 1.73 82.4 48.3 34.1
3. B Pastel Lady Shaver 5r 2.01 1.64 82.0 45.7 35.2
4. B Shaver 10r 2.39 2.00 84.1 34.5 49.6
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
5. G Daisy Slim 5r 1.89 1.48 77.9 4.20 68.2
6. G Good News 3r 2.19 1.71 78.6 37.9 40.9
7. G Good News 10r 4.83 4.38 90.6 35.6 54.8
8. G Good News Microtrac 5r 2.89 2.41 83.6 34.5 48.2
9. G Good News Pivot Plus 10r 4.66 4.15 89.3 36.1 55.0
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
10. ASR Personna Flicker 5r 3.74 3.39 90.2 61.0 28.7
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
11. PL Single Blade 5r 1.01 0.62 61.8  
12. PL Twin Blade 5r 1.67 1.28 76.7  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
13. WL Schick Slim Twin 5r 2.69 2.30 85.6 35.6 49.4
14. WL Schick Slim Twin 10r 4.03 3.65 90.7 35.1 55.7
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
15. WS Colors 5r 1.29 0.92 71.1 61.9 9.50
16. WS Ultra Glide Twin 5r 1.69 1.32 78.8 43.8 34.1
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Overall Median 3.02 2.59 85.8  
Median Excluding PL 3.37 2.95 87.4 36.6 51.6
* Figures denote the median price, average acquisition cost and inferred marginal cost over the
643 store-quarter combinations. B: BIC, G: Gillette, ASR: American Safety Razor, PL: Private
Label, WL: Warner-Lambert, WS: Wilkinson Sword. 3r, 5r and 10r denote package sizes of 3,




UPC Coordinated Defection Bertr-Nash
1. B Lady Shaver 10r 2.206 2.003 1.999
2. B Metal Shaver 5r 2.304 2.093 2.090
3. B Pastel Lady Shaver 5r 2.146 1.992 1.990
4. B Shaver 10r 2.503 2.391 2.390
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
5. G Daisy Slim 5r 2.564 2.465 2.445
6. G Good News 3r 2.093 2.004 1.990
7. G Good News 10r 4.793 4.722 4.719
8. G Good News Microtrac 5r 2.707 2.606 2.590
9. G Good News Pivot Plus 10r 4.509 4.410 4.390
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
10. ASR Personna Flicker 5r 4.155 3.990 3.990
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
11. PL Single Blade 5r 1.090 0.993 0.990
12. PL Twin Blade 5r 1.254 1.163 1.158
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
13. WL Schick Slim Twin 5r 2.257 2.061 2.057
14. WL Schick Slim Twin 10r 4.118 3.991 3.990
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
15. WS Colors 5r 1.484 1.270 1.269
16. WS Ultra Glide Twin 5r 1.887 1.670 1.669
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Overall Median 2.889  2.780
* Figures are the median pre-partial acquisition counterfactual price level for each product over
81 stores. B: BIC, G: Gillette, ASR: American Safety Razor, PL: Private Label, WL: Warner-
Lambert, WS: Wilkinson Sword. 3r, 5r and 10r denote package sizes of 3, 5 and 10 razors,
respectively.
Table 7
Pre-Partial Acquisition Non-Deviation Condition*
Static Aggregated Prots $ (%) Critical
Firm gain from deviating loss from punishment Threshold
1. BIC 135,047 (11%) 28,039 (2%) 0.792
2. Gillette 610,600 (7%) 450,802 (5%) 0.262
3. American Safety Razor 17,630 (15%) 1,966 (2%) 0.888
4. Private Label 349,844 (8%) 152,630 (3%) 0.564
5. Warner-Lambert 173,202 (11%) 36,421 (2%) 0.790
6. Wilkinson Sword 7,168 (18%) 1,328 (3%) 0.815

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Post-Partial Acquisition Non-Deviation Condition*
WS independent WS acquired by
shareholder G 100% G 22.9% G 22.9% WL 100%
Firm structure voting nonvoting voting voting
Panel A: Gain from Deviating $ (percentage change)
1. BIC 135,047 -0.676 -0.071 -0.193 -0.159
2. Gillette 610,600 -0.361 -0.044 -0.224 -0.239
3. American Safety Razor 17,630 -0.607 -0.062 -0.170 -0.136
4. Private Label 349,844 -0.819 -0.085 -0.234 -0.197
5. Warner-Lambert 173,202 -0.730 -0.078 -0.208 2.556
6. Wilkinson Sword 7,168  -0.126 -0.070 
Panel B: Loss from Punishment $ (percentage change)
1. BIC 28,039 -3.256 -0.342 -0.927 -0.767
2. Gillette 450,802 -0.149 -0.063 -0.181 -0.324
3. American Safety Razor 1,966 -5.443 -0.560 -1.526 -1.221
4. Private Label 152,630 -1.877 -0.194 -0.537 -0.451
5. Warner-Lambert 36,421 -3.471 -0.371 -0.991 3.347
6. Wilkinson Sword 1,328  -0.678 10.994 
Panel C: Critical Threshold dis.fact. (value)
1. BIC 0.792 0.798 0.793 0.794 0.794
2. Gillette 0.262 0.260 0.261 0.261 0.262
3. American Safety Razor 0.888 0.894 0.889 0.890 0.890
4. Private Label 0.564 0.568 0.564 0.565 0.565
5. Warner-Lambert 0.790 0.796 0.790 0.791 0.788
6. Wilkinson Sword 0.815  0.816 0.794 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Temporary Price Promotions Characterization*
UPC Level
Mean Median Std Min Max
Promotion 0.115 0.000 0.319 0.000 1.000
Promotion Discount (%) 22.864 20.761 12.113 5.010 74.874
Duration from Last Promotion (weeks) 11.833 4.000 17.823 1.000 94.000
* Promotion statistics are based on 137,808 store-week-upc observations (since our temporary price promotion
denition makes use of the rst and last observation of the sequence of prices of each UPC in a given supermarket).
Promotion Discount and Duration from Last Promotion statistics are conditional on a promotion and therefore
are based on the corresponding 15,869 store-week-upc observations.
Table B3
Temporary Price Promotions and Quantity Discount*
Package Weeks on Quantity Sold on Quantity
Size Promotion (%) Promotion (%) Discount (%)
5 Razors 11.427 19.027 
10 Razors 11.967 23.959 29.635
12 Razors 11.755 15.489 52.555
15 Razors 6.199 7.875 61.278
* Weeks on Promotion and Quantity Sold on Promotion denote, conditional on pack-
age size, the percentage of weeks a promotion was o¤ered and the percentage of
number of packages sold on promotion, respectively. Figures are computed across all
stores, weeks and UPCs. Quantity discount computed as the ratio of each dummy
variable coe¢ cient to the constant, from a regression of the price per 5 razors on size
dummy variables, controlling for temporary price promotions as well as product and
store xed e¤ects.
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